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EXPATRIATION OF AMERICAN MINORS*

Lester B. Orfield t

T

HE United States Supreme Court in May, 1939, handed down a
vitally significant decision on the expatriation of American minors.1
Prior to that date, one was forced to deduce the law from conflicting
decisions of the lower federal courts and of state courts, rulings by the
departments of state, labor, and justice, and views of writers. This,
therefore, seems an appropriate time at which to discuss the problems
which have been raised and the.solutions which have been offered.
The facts of this notable case were these: Miss Elg was born in
Brooklyn, New York, on October 2, 1907. Her parents were born in
Sweden. At some time prior to 1906 they had migrated to the United
States and her father had been naturalized before a United States
district court on September 24, l 906. In l 9 l l her mother returned to

* Grateful acknowledgement is made to Attorney General Robert H. Jackson for
copies of the government's briefs and to Henry F. Butler, Esq., of Washington, D.C.,
for copies of the briefs for Miss Elg, in Perkins v. Elg., 307 U. S. 325, 59 S. Ct.
884 (1939).
Professor of Law, University of Nebraska; B. A., LL.B., Minnesota; M.A.,
Duke; S.J.D., Michigan. Editor, Nebraska Law Bulletin; author, "Criminal Appeals
in America" (1939), and numerous articles in legal periodicals.-Ed.
1 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325, 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939). The opinion was unanimous. Justice Douglas took no part. That the strongest possible argument for the government was presented may be inferred from the fact that the only cases lost by the
government at the October 1938 term were this one and the Strecker case. For a
similar decision as to the expatriation of American women through marriage to aliens,
see Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 36 S. Ct. 106 (1915). The Court there upheld
the power of Congress by statute to expatriate American women through their marriage
to aliens even though they retained their residence in the United States, But in 1922
and subsequently Congress repealed the act of 1907 providing for such expatriation.
There has been no decision by the Supreme Court as to expatriation of American
women marrying aliens before the act of I 907 providing for expatriation. A reasonable
implication of the present case is that more clearly than formerly appeared such women
were not _expatriated; that their expatriation through marriage could be accomplished
only through express treaty or statutory provision. See comment by the writer, 16
NEB. L. BULL, 176 (1937).

t

586

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 38

Sweden accompanied by Miss Elg. Miss Elg continued her residence
uninterruptedly with her mother in Sweden until September 7, 1929.
On July 25, 1922, her father returned to Sweden, where he has since
resided. She resided with her father from the time he returned to
Sweden in 1922 until she came to the United States on September 17,
1929, on a passport obtained from the department of state on July 22,
1929. She has resided in the United States ever since: On November
13, 1934, her father made a statement before an American consul in
Sweden that he had voluntarily expatriated himself with respect to
his American citizenship and intended to preserve his allegiance to
Sweden. A communication dated October 30, 1934, from the Swedish
ministry for foreign affairs to the American legation at Stockholm stated
that her father had reacquired Swedish citizenship in 1924 through his
two years' residence in Sweden, and that she had also acquired Swedish
citizenship. The immigration and naturalization service of the United
States under date of April 8, l9J5, served her with notice of deportation as an alien who had not been legally admitted to the United States.
Deportation proceedings were postponed from time to time. On July
16, 1936, she applied to the state department for a passport as an
American citizen, but such passport was refused on July 29, 1936,
on the ground that she was not an American citizen. On January 14,
1937, she brought suit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia against the secretary of labor, the acting commissioner of immigration and naturalization and the secretary of state,
asking for a declaratory judgment that she was an American citizen
and for an injunction against deportation and failure to issue a passport.
The district judge, Bailey, granted a declaratory judgment against the
secretary of labor and the acting commissioner of immigration and
naturalization, but dismissed the petition against the secretary of state.
The court of appeals affirmed this decision. Cross-appeals on certiorari,
granted on December 5, 1938, carried the case to the United States
Supreme Court, where Miss Elg won a declaratory decree against all
parties including the secretary of state.
The subject of expatriation of infants may be considered from a
number of points of view. One may ask what international law has to
say on the subject, if anything, whether through treaty or through
judicial decision. One may ask what are the rules of municipal law,
more particularly those of the United States. With respect to the law
of the United States one may ask what are the rules under the Constitution, under treaties, under statutes, and at common law. One may
make inquiry with respect to minors born in the United States (thus
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citizens jure soli),2 minors born outside the United States, of American parents (thus citizens jure sanguini.s),8 and minors who have become American citizens through the naturalization of their parents.
INTERNATIONAL LAW

One need not long be detained by the possible limitations laid
down by international law. In the absence of treaty it seems clear that
international law does not stand in the way of expatriation of American
minors, nor does it, on the other hand, stand in the way of retention of
American citizenship by American minors.' That it does not stand
in the way of expatriation would seem to follow from the fact that
international law does not protect against statelessness. Hence the fact
that a minor was expatriated without gaining any other citizenship,
though highly regrettable, would make no di:fference as far as international law is concerned. That international law does not stand in the
way of the retention of American citizenship may be reasonably implied
from the fact that international law admits of dual citizenship. 5 Hence
the fact that a minor had acquired another citizenship would not mean
that he lost his American citizenship. There are countless cases of minors
and adults who are American citizens because born in the United States
but also European citizens because their parents were European citizens.
It has thus been seen that traditional international law necessitates
no doctrine of expatriation of American minors. In the absence of a
treaty, this country need not recognize the expatriation abroad of
minors or even of their parents. 6 An increasing amount of international
2
ln turn, one may inquire whether there are any distinctions where the parents
are native-born American citizens, where they are naturalized citizens, and where
they are aliens.
8
In turn, one may inquire whether there are distinctions between minors where
both parents are Americans and where only one parent is an American.
' For a discussion of awards by international arbitration commissions, see Flournoy,
"Dual Nationality and Election," 30 YALE L. J. 693 (1921). In Alexander v. United
States, 3 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATIONS 2529 (1898), where a minor was
born in the United States and went to Scotland, the country of his father, and later
returned to the United States, it was held that he had never lost his American citizenship. See also Gautier v. Mexico, 3 ibid., 2450; Oscar Chopin v. United States, 3
ibid., 2506; BouTWELL, REPORT 88 (1880); the Canevaro case before the Permanent
Court of Arbitration, Italy v. Peru, 6 AM. J. INT. L. 747 (1912); Advisory Opinion
of the Permanent Court of International Justice upon the nationality decrees issued in
Tunis and Morocco, HAGUE, PERM. CT. INT. J., Ser. B., No. 4, p. 24 (Feb. 7, 1923).
5
"As municipal law determines how citizenship may be acquired, it follows that
persons may have a dual nationality." Hughes, C. J., in Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S.
325 at 329, 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939).
6
Borchard, "Decadence of the American Doctrine of Voluntary Expatriation,"
25 AM. J. INT. L. 312 (1931).
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law, however, is to be found in treaties. The express provisions of a
treaty between the United States and another state might call for the
expatriation of American minors under certain circumstances. There is
nothing in traditional international law that bars the making of such
.treaties. Since treaties under the Constitution of the United States are
a form of municipal law, consideration of the effect of treaties will be
postponed until the discussion of municipal law limitations upon expatriation. Suffice it to say here that, so far as the writer is informed,
.no treaty entered into by the United States up to the present time
has contained express provisions for the expatriation of minors born in
the United States. In no case decided by the United States Supreme
Court has a treaty been held even impliedly to provide for such expatriation. In fact, the idea of expatriation by implication seems to have
been rejected in Perkins v. Elg.1
MUNICIPAL LAW

The Constitution
In examining the doctrines of the municipal law of the United
States concerning expatriation, it behooves one at the outset to consider
whether there are any constitutional limitations on the expatriation
of minors. The Constitution nowhere expressly forbids the expatriation
of minors; nor does it expressly permit such expatriation. It is true that
the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "All persons born or natural'ized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are
citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside."
Obviously this means at least that the effect of birth on citizenship may
not be ch~nged. The nationality of the parents is immaterial. 8 Thus
while Chinese and Japanese are not permitted by the United States
to migrate to this country and to be naturalized, persons of such races
.born here become American citizens.9 But the Constitution does not
compel the conferring of American citizenship on children of American
7 307 U. S. 325 at 337, 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939): "If the abrogation of that right
had been in contemplation, it would naturally have been the subject of a provision
suitably explicit."
·
8 In United States v. Reid, (C. C. A. 9th, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 153, the parents
were native Americans, though expatriation was permitted. In Perkins v. Elg the parents
. were naturalized American citizens who had come from Sweden, and expatriation was
not allowed by either the Supreme Court or the court of appeals. In Citizenship
of Ingrid Therese Tobiassen, 36 OP. ATTY. GEN. 535 (1932), the parents were aliens
from Norway who became naturalized after the birth of the minor, and expatriation
'was· allowed.
·
9 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649, 18 S. Ct. 456 (1898).
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citizens where such children are born abroad, nor does it compel the
granting of permission to become naturalized American citizens to
minors who may come to this country either alone or with their parents.
That being true, if any distinction were to be taken between minors
who are citizens 'because of birth in the United States and minors who
are citizens for other reasons, it would seem that expatriation of the
latter should be permitted without necessarily allowing it as to the
former.
The court of appeals in Perkins v. Elg stated with respect to the
rights of a minor that "it is doubtful, indeed, if there is any power in
Congress,-in view of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
...-to take them away." 10 The Supreme Court seems to have felt
that Congress has such power through statute and treaty. The government, in its brief, pointed out that the Fourteenth Amendment was
adopted as a restriction not on the powers of Congress but rather on
the powers of the states.11 The Fourteenth Amendment did not have
the effect of setting "doctrinaire restrictions preventing the Congress
from acting as a member of the community of nations and prescribing
reasonable provisions, adopted in many other countries, with respect
to the expatriation of citizens." 12 As the Supreme Court had said in
Mackenzie v. Hare:
"Plaintiff contends, as we have seen, that it has not, and bases
her contention upon the absence of an express gift of power. But
there may be powers implied, necessary or incidental to the expressed powers. As a government, the United States is invested
with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has the character of
nationality it has the powers of nationality, especially those which
concern its relations and intercourse with other countries. We
should hesitate long before limiting or embarrassing such
powers." 18
It is dear that adults who were American citizens because of birth
in the United States may be expatriated under certain circumstances.
Neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor any other part of the Constitution stands in the way of voluntary expatriation. For instance, a
citizen may expatriate himself by naturalization in a foreign country
10
(App. D. C. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 408 at 413. See also In re Reid, (D. C. Ore.
1934) 6 F. Supp. 800, reversed on appeal (C. C. A. 9th, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 153.
11
Brief for Petitioner, p. 56.
12
Brief for Petitioner, p. 56. For the government's argument as to constitutionality of statutes, see pp. 54-62; and as to treaties, pp. 63-68.
18
239 U. S. 299 at 3II, 36 S. Ct. I06 (1915).
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or by talring an oath of allegiance to a foreign sovereign.14 There have
been dicta to the e:ffect that Congress cannot by legislative action ex.patriate a citizen without his consent.15 That is to say, the Constitution
forbids involuntary expatriation. But a rather broad meaning has been
given to the term "voluntary." The act resulting in expatriation might
be perfectly legal and in no sense improper. It has been held that
Congress may provide for the expatriation of an American woman by
marriage to an alien even though she continued to reside in the United
States.16 The Court said that the consent to expatriation is implied from
the voluntary performance of an act which will result in expatriation.
Until the recent case, it appeared open to doubt whether the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited legislation, not arbitrary in its naturei
expatriating a citizen without his consent.11 To say that a citizen by
14 Act of March 2, 1907, § 2, 34 Stat. L. iz28, 8 U.S. C. (1934), § 17, quoted
infra at note 60.
1 ~ The Supreme Court stated in United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U. S. 649
at 703, 704, I 8 S. Ct. 456 ( I 898): "The power of naturalization, vested in Congress
by the Constitution, is a power to confer citizenship, not a power to take it away••••
The Fourteenth Amendment, while it leaves the power, where it was before, in Congress, to regulate naturalization, has conferred no authority upon Congress to restrict
the effect of birth, declared by the Constitution to constitute a sufficient and complete
right to citizenship••••
"No doubt he might himself, after coming of age, renounce this citizenship,
and become a citizen of the country of his parents, or of any other country.••• Whether
any act of himself, or of his parents, during his minority, could have the same effect,
is at least doubtful."
.
The Supreme Court stated in Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299 at 311,
36 S. Ct. I06 (1915): "It may be conceded that a change of citizenship cannot be
arbitrarily imposed, that is, imposed without the concurrence of the citizen."
In Burkett v. McCarty, IO Bush (73 Ky.) 758 at 759 (1874), the court
stated that "no mere act of state legislation can per se denationalize him against his will
or without his concurrence." But this was a vindication of state, not national, citizenship, and was concerned not with the status of a minor, but with that of an adult
expatriated by way of punishment and without judicial trial.
In Ainslie v. Martin, 9 Mass. 454 at 461 (1813), the court stated that the
sovereign cannot discharge a subject "from his allegiance against his consent" except
by disfranchisement "as a punishment for some crime." But the court stated this by
way of corollary to the earlier and now discarded rule that no subject can expatriate
himself.
16 Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299, 36 S. Ct. I06 (1915). The court stated,
239 U. S. at 311, that although there was no express gift of this power, "there may be
powers implied, necessary or incidental to the expressed powers. As a government, the
United States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty."
17 The Supreme Court stated as to expatriation by marriage: "This is no arbitrary exercise of government." Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299 at 312, 36: S. Ct.
106 (1915). See Ro-rrscHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW
378 (r939); 19 MINN. L. REv. 589 (1935).
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marrying consented to expatriation, bordered on fiction, particularly in
an era of increasing rights for women.18
Even if it were admitted that Congress could not by statute provide
for involuntary expatriation, it would by no means follow that a treaty
might not validly so provide.19 The Supreme Court has said: "The
treaty-making power is broad enough to cover all subjects that properly pertain to our foreign relations" 20 extending "to all proper subjects of negotiation with foreign governments." 21 Expatriation of
nationals who become attached to the allegiance of another government
is a subject properly pertaining to our foreign relations. Since, as was
seen in Mackenzie v. Hare, Congress has the implied power to pass
statutes providing for the expatriation of American women marrying
aliens, a fortiori treaties may deal with the subject. Such treaties promote international amity by reducing the number of cases of dual
nationality. Seventy years ago the United States entered into nine
naturalization treaties. Since that time it has signed a multipartite pact
and concluded twelve other bipartite naturalization treaties, the latest,
with the now defunct Albania,2 2 having become effective in 1935.
Granted that expatriation is the proper subject for a treaty, there
may still be difficulty as to whether treaties may provide for the expatriation of minors because of the naturalization abroad of their parent.
Perhaps the possible limitations on the treaty-making power have been
stated most broadly and emphatically by the Supreme Court in Geofroy
v. Riggs: 28
18

The Supreme Court stated its theory in Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U. S. 299 at
3 II, 36 S. Ct. 106 (1915): "The identity of husband and wife is an ancient principle
of our jurisprudence. It was neither accidental nor arbitrary and worked in many instances
for her protection. There has been, it is true, much relaxation of it but in its retention as in its origin it is determined by their intimate relation and unity of interests,
and this relation and unity may make it of public concern in many instances to merge
their identity, and give dominance to the husband. It has purpose, if not necessity, in
purely domestic policy; it has greater purpose and, it may be, necessity, in international
policy.»
19
The Supreme Court in Perkins v. Elg seems to hold expatriation within the
treaty-making power. To the same effect, see United States v. Reid, (C. C. A. 9th,
1934) 73 F. (2d) 153, certiorari denied 299 U.S. 544, 57 S. Ct. 44 (1936), because
the petition was not filed in time. See contrary language in In re Reid, (D. C. Ore.
1934) 6 F. Supp. 800.
20
Santovincenzo v. Egan, 284 U.S. 30 at 40, 52 S. Ct. 81 (1931).
21
In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 at 463, II S. Ct. 897 (1891); Asakura v. Seattle,
265 U.S. 332 at 341, 44 S. Ct. 515 (1924).
22
49 Stat. L. 3241 (1932).
28
133 U.S. 258 at 267, IO S. Ct. 295 (1890), citing Fort Leavenworth R.R.
v. Lowe, II4 U.S. 525, 5 S. Ct. 995 (1885).
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"The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms
unlimited except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the action of the government or its departments,
and those arising from the nature of the government itself and of
that of the States. It would not be contended that it extends so far
as to authorize what the Constitution forbids, or a change in the
character of the government or in that of one of the states, or a
cession of any portion of the territory of the latter, without its
consent. • • • But with these exceptions, it is not perceived that
there is any limit. to the questions which can be adjusted touching
any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a
foreign country."
·
A treaty providing for expatriation of minors through the naturalization of their parents would seem not to violate any of the specific
prohibitjons stated in this opinion. It does not attempt to authorize
"what the Constitution forbids." 24 The Fourteenth Amendment does
not in express language forbid such treaties. In the words of Justice
Holmes in Missouri v. Holland, 25 such a treaty would not "contravene
any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only question is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the
general terms" of the Fourteenth Amendment. Orie may also recall the
words of Justice Chase in Ware v. Hylton: "If the court possesses
·a power to declare treaties void, I shall never exercise it, but in a very
clear case indeed." 26 Thus far no treaty has been declared unconstitutional. Conceivably the Fourteenth Amendment forbids treaties providing for "unreasonable" ·expatriation, but that is not the equivalent
of "involuntary expatriation" of a minor by the act of his father. 27
Assuming that the Constitution permits only voluntary expatriation,
should the case of the minor be regarded like that of the married
woman? Can it be said that the expatriation of the parent is the voluntary act of the child? 'It has been so asserted on principle,28 and there
24 Professor Rottschaefer says that this limit "may be ignored since there is no
indication of how to determine what it forbids in connection with the treaty-making
power." RorncHAEFER, HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW 384-385
(1939).
25 252 U.S. 416 at 433-434, 40 S. Ct. 382 (1920).
26 3 Dall. 199 at 237 (1796). See also United States v. Reid, (C. C. A. 9th,
1934) 73 F. (2d) 153.
27 See Brief for Petitioner in Perkins v. Elg, at p. 67.
28 The solicitor general argued in Perkins v. Elg that family unity was desirable
in matters of citizenship. ~rief for the Petitioner, pp. 58-62. Traditionally the
father had acted for the child. Congress was not acting arbitrarily in giving weight to the
concept of family unity. While normally a change of domicile calls for voluntary action
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is case authority supporting the view of voluntary expatriation in such
a case.20 On the other hand, with respect to expatriation under the 1907
act of Congress by virtue of the taking of an oath of allegiance to a
foreign state, it has been held that such oath must be taken volun:tarily,80 and that such expatriation cannot be effected by one adjudged
insane,81 or a minor acting on his own behalf.82
The recent case of Perkins v. Elg would seem to lead to :the conclusion that the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the involuntary expatriation of minors if that is accomplished by treaty or by act
of Congress. In the absence of treaty or statute, there must be voluntary action by the minor "in conformity with applicable legal principles." 88 As Chief Justice Hughes stated: "As at birth she became a
citizen of the United States, that citizenship must be deemed to continue unless she has been deprived of it through the operation of a
treaty or congressional enactment or by her voluntary action in conformity with applicable legal principles." 84 Since the Court found that
no treaty or statute provided for expatriation of minors, it was not
strictly necessary for the Court to hold that such treaty or statute
would be permissible under the Constitution. All that it was requisite
for the Court to decide was that, in the absence of treaty or statute,
minors may not constitutionally be deprived without their consent of
and formation of an intent to reside, an infant cannot change his domicile, and his
domicile follows that of his father, or his widowed mother. Lamar v. Micou, II2 U.S.
452 at 470, 5 S. Ct. 221 (1884). At common law the child takes the nationality of
the father. In re Page, (D. C. Cal. 1926) 12 F. (2d) 135. The United States applies
the doctrine of citizenship jure sanguinis as well as that of juri soli. Since 1 790
Congress by statute has provided that the naturalization of a father shall confer American citizenship on his children dwelling in the United States. More than twenty
countries provide for expatriation in the case of a minor who acquires a new nationality
in a foreign country by virtue of his parents' naturalization. Harvard Draft Convention
on Nationality, 23 AM. J. INT. L. SPEC. SuPP. 105 (1929). Moreover, if Congress
could not expatriate minors born in the United States, it could not expatriate naturalized
minors, since natur~ized citizens possess all the rights of a native citizen except
eligibility for the prf!Sidency.
29
Ostby v. Salmon, 177 Minn. 289, 225 N. W. 158 (1929); Koppe v. Pfefferle,
188 Minn. 619, 248 N. W. 41 (1933) (two judges dissenting and one taking no
part); Harvard Draft Convention on Nationality, 23 AM. J. INT. L. SPEC. SuPP.
53-54 (1929).
.
so United States ex rel. Fracassi v. Karnuth, (D. C. N. Y. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 581.
81
McCampbell v. McCampbell, (D. C. Ky. 1936) 13 F. Supp. 847.
82
United States ex rel. Baglivo v. Day, (D. C. N. Y. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 44.
33
Quaere, can there be any form of binding expatriation by an infant by his own
act during his infancy? Compare United States ex rel. Baglivo v. Day, (D. C. N. Y.
1928) 28 F. (2d) 44. What is voluntary actio:ii by an infant "in conformity with
applicable legal principles"?
34
Perkins v. Elg, 307 U. S. 325 at 329, 5<}1 S. Ct. 884 (1939).

594

M1cHrGAN LAW

REvrnw

[ Vol. 38

their American citizenship. The Court does, and is forced to, decide
whether the Fourteenth Amendment precludes involuntary expatriation
of minors through administrative or judicial decision founded on usage
and common law without the support of treaty or statute. 35
Since by treaty or act of Congress minors born in the United States
can be involuntarily expatriated, it would seem even more clearly that
minors who are citizens jure sanguinis or citizens by derivation through
the naturalization of the parents are subject to the same procedure.
Expatriation through administrative ruling or judicial precedent would
not seem so clearly precluded by the Fourteenth Amendment, though
it should be remembered that the Fourteenth Amendment states that
persons "naturalized in the United States" are citizens of the United
States just as it states that persons "born" in the United States are
citizens of the United States. Possibly it can be said that arbitrary
deprivation of citizenship of these two classes of minors would be in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment or the due process clause
of the Fifth Amendment. It is to be borne in mind that citizens ju-re
sanguinis have all the rights of citizens jure soli, including the right
to be president or vice president if elected, whereas naturalized citizens
have all rights except the latter. It may be noted that naturalized
citizens are mentioned in the Fourteenth Amendment while citizens
jure sanguinis are not.
Treaties
Assuming that treaties may constitutionally provide for the involuntary expatriation of American minors, as Perkins v. Elg seems to
hold, the next problem in a given case is to decid~ whether a treaty
or treaties have done so.36 Thus far in the adjudicated cases no treaty
has been construed by the United States Supreme Court as providing
for involuntary expatriation.81 The Supreme Court held in Perkins v.
Elg, contrary to recent views of the department of state and of the
See the statement of Chief Justice Hughes quoted infra at note 122.
For an argument that the Treaty of 1869 with Sweden provided for involuntary expatriation, see Brief for Petitioner in Perkins v. Elg, pp. 18-41.
81 The Minnesota court, however, has held that a treaty provided for involuntary
expatriation. Ostby v. Salmon, 177 Minn. 289, 225 N. W. 158 (1929); Koppe v.
Pfefferle, 188 Minn. 619, 248 N. W. 41 (1933).
A federal circuit court of appeals also so hefd in United States v. Reid, (C. C. A.
9th, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 153, certiorari denied because petition was not filed on time,
299 U. S. 544, 57 S. Ct. 44 (1936). The federal district court in that case held that
a treaty if so construed would be unconstitutional. In re Reid, (D. C. Ore. 1934) 6
F. Supp. 800. The treaty involved was the 1870 naturalization treaty with Great
Britain. 16 Stat. L. 775 (1870). Favoring interpretation of treaties to allow involuntary expatriation, see 34 CoL. L. REV. 1366 (1934).
85
86
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attorney general in the Tobiassen 88 case, that the treaty with Sweden
of 1869 89 required the recognition only of a voluntary expatriation,4°
hence did not extend to minors born in the United States who are taken
abroad by their parents. The treaty did not specifically mention minors
who had obtained citizenship by birth in the country which their parents
had left.41 Miss Elg had not expatriated herself by remaining in
Sweden from the age of four till she was twenty-one. She had retained
and had exercised the right of electing American citizenship by returning to the United States on attaining her majority. Furthermore,
article III of the treaty, which allowed each state to receive back its
original citizens who had been naturalized in the other and then returned to their native country and applied for readmission, was deemed
to cover the return to the United States of Miss Elg, even if one were
to concede that she had acquired Swedish citizenship through the
alleged renaturalization there of her father. No provision of the treaty
barred the United States from treating Miss Elg as having elected
United States citizenship, which as a matter of fact she had never lost.
Even if the "intent not to return" to America could under article III
of the protocol be inferred from a two-year period of Swedish residence, this provision was applicable to the parent only, and could not
have any application to a minor. Even if it did apply to a minor, it was
a presumption rebutted by her actual return to the United States.42
The Sugreme Court has thus indicated that it will not readily
assume that a treaty has abrogated the right of a minor born in the
United States to elect American citizenship on attaining his majority.
As Chief Justice Hughes stated: "If the abrogation of that right had
been in contemplation, it would naturally have been the subject of a
provision suitably explicit. Rights of citizenship are not to be destroyed
by an ambiguity." 48 The writer knows of no treaty expressly providing
for the expatriation of minors who are citizens jure sanguinis. Probably
the Court would not imply involuntary expatriation in such a case
either. Some recent treaties have expressly provided for the expatriaCitizenship of Ingrid Therese Tobiassen, 36 OP. Arn. GEN. 535 (1932).
17 Stat. L. 809 (1869).
40 307 U. S. 325 at 335 ff. The court of appeals did not consider the meaning
or effect of the treaty.
41
307 U. S. 325 at 337.
42
United States ex rel. Anderson v. Howe, (D. C. N. Y. 1916) 231 F. 546.
This case suggests that Congress may by statute constitutionally lay down such a rule.
See also Flournoy, "Naturalization and Expatriation," 31 YALE L. J. 848 at 861
(1922); 3 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 754 (1906).
48
307 U. S. 325 at 337·
88
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tion of minors who had become naturalized American citizens.44 It is
believed that in the absence of such express provisions the Court would
not imply involuntary expatriation in this case either.
The construction by the Supreme Court of the treaty with Sweden
was supported by the construction given to naturalization treaties
during the period from r868 to r872. 45 The first of these treaties, containing provisions similar to those found in the treaty with Sweden,
was made with the North German Confederation.46 In Steinkauler's
Case,41 arising in r875, with respect to this treaty, Attorney General
Pierrepont uphe~ d the right of election, saying:
"Under the treaty, and in harmony with the American doctrine, it is clear that Steinkauler, the father, abandoned his naturalization in America and became a German subject (his son being
-yet a minor), and that by virtue of German laws the son acquired
German nationality. It is equally clear that the son by birth has
American· nationality; and hence he has two nationalities, one
natural, the other acquired.•.. There is no law of the United
States under which his father or any other person can deprive him
of his birthright."
Four years later in r879 Secretary of State Evarts ruled to the same
e:ffect with respect to the same treaty. 48
The naturalization treaty with Denmark of r872 49 contained similar provisions. Secretary Evarts construed this treaty also as not providing for expatriation. 60 In the words of Chief Justice Hughes: "These
44 ln the recent treaties with Bulgaria (1923), Czechoslovakia (1928), and Albania ( I 93 2), there was expressly retained within the definition of "naturalized" citizens minors who had acquired American citizenship through the naturalization of their
parents. See Brief for Petitioner, pp. 28, 25, note 18. The statutes were respectively:
43 Stat. L. 1759 (1923); 46 Stat. L. 2424 (1928); 49 Stat. L. 3241 (1932).
46 307 U.S. 325 at 339. Twelve such treaties were concluded between 1902 and
1932. See Brief for Petitioner, p. 25, note 18.
46 15 Stat. L. 615 (1868).
47 15 OP. Arn. GEN. 15 at 17 (1875). Petitioner, in its brief in Perkins v.
Elg, at pp. 36-37, asserted, however, that the dictum relied on by the court of appeals
from the Steinkauler case "did not even consider what effect the treaty might have
upon the child." Petitioner concluded that the considered executive interpretation of
the naturalization treaties was one of involuntary expatriation of minors; and that the
opinions of the state department cited by the court of appeals to the contrary effect
involved situations not within the purview of any naturalization treaty. For instance,
in the Tobiassen Case, 36 OP. Arn. GEN. 535 (1932), the state department claimed
expatriation because of a naturalization treaty with Norway.
48 3 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAw DIGEST 543 (1906).
49 17 Stat. L. 941 (1872).
60·3 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 544 (1906).

EXPATRIATION OF MINORS

597

rulings, following closely upon the negotiation of these naturalization
treaties, show beyond question that the treaties were not regarded as
abrogating the right of election for which respondent here contends." 51
Subsequent rulings were to the same effect. For instance in 1890,
Acting Secretary of State Wharton asserted the right of election at
majority as to a minor who upon his own application had been admitted
to Danish citizenship during his minority. 52 An instruction by Secretary
of State Sherman in 1897 with respect to an American Ininor who had
acquired American citizenship through the naturalization of his father
confirms this view. 58 It would seem that if treaties do not expatriate
naturalized Ininors, a fortiori they do not expatriate minors born in
the United States. As late as 1906 the department of state issued a
memorandum maintaining the right of election. 54
In the Tobiassen case the state department, relying on the naturalization treaty between the United States and Norway, took the position
that Miss Tobiassen had ceased to be an American citizen. 55 The attorney general gave an opinion relying on the siinilarity of the Norwegian
statute to our own statute conferring derivative citizenship upon
minors. 56 He discussed the scope of the treaty-making power without
indicating clearly whether or not the treaty was also relied upon. He
agreed with the state department that Miss Tobiassen had been expatriated.
A number of treaties have provided for the acquisition of American
citizenship by minors through the naturalization of their parents. Since
1790, acts of Congress have also so provided. 57 Reciprocally these
treaties may have perinitted American minors to acquire foreign citizenship through the naturalization of their parents. But the fact that the
United States may make it easy for alien minors to acquire American
citizenship does not prove that it also wishes to facilitate the loss of
American citizenship by American minors. Furthermore there is no reason why, even if the treaties perinit the acquisition of foreign citizenship
by American minors, such minors may not retain their American citi51

Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 at 340, 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939).
3 MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 715 (1906).
58
3 ibid., 472 (1906).
5
4. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 657 (1906) (U.S. Dept. State).
55
Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur J. Carr in a letter to the Attorney General,
dated October 7, 1931, stated that the state department had for many years construed
the naturalization treaties as providing for involuntary expatriation of minors. See
Supplemental Memorandum for Petitioner in Perkins v. Elg, Appendix A, pp. 9, 10.
56
36 OP. ATTY. GEN. 535 (1932).
57
Act of March 26, 1790, I Stat. L. 103.
52
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zenship. As the Supreme Court states in Perkins v. Elg persons may
have a dual nationality. Gs
Statutes
As the Supreme Court held in Perkins v. Elg, Congress might by
statute provide for involuntary expatriation of minors. But as in the
case of treaties the Supreme Court has never construed any Congressional enactment as making such provision. The Government argued 69
in Perkins v. Elg that section 2 of the act of March 2, I907 60 barred
the right of election. This section provides:
"That any American citizen shall be deemed to have expatriated himself when he has been naturalized in any foreign state
in conformity with its laws, or when he has taken an oath of
allegiance to any foreign state.
"When aqy naturalized citizen shall have resided for two
years in the foreign state from which he came, or for five years
in any other foreign state it shall be presumed that he has ceased
to be an American citizen, and the place of his general abode shall
be deemed his place of residence during said years: Provided, however, That such presumption may be overcome on the presentation of satisfactory evidence to a diplomatic or consular officer
of the United States, under such rules and regulations as the
Department of State may prescribe. And provided also, That no
American citizen shall be allowed to expatriate himself when this
country is at war."
It may be noted that the second paragraph of this section applies
only to naturalized citizens. It merely raises a presumption of expatriation based on voluntary acts. It expressly provides that the presumption shall be rebuttable. It does not expressly apply to minors who
have become naturalized American citizens. Since the I 907 statute
was found by the .Court not to be aimed at involuntary expatriation
of minors born in the United States, possibly the court might take the
same view as to naturalized minors.
As to involuntary expatriation of minors born American citizens
fure sanguinis, here again no statute expressly provides for their expatriation where both parents are Americans. 61 Under the act of March
2, I907, such children who continued to reside outside the United
307 U. S. 325 at 329, 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939).
Brief for Petitioner, pp. 41-45.
60 34 Stat. L. 1228, 8 U.S. C. (1934), § 17.
61 Or.field, "The Citizenship Act of 1934," 2 UNiv. Ciu. L. REV. 99 at 102
(1934).
Gs

159

EXPATRIATION OF MINORS

599

States must, in order to receive the protection of the United States,
upon reaching the age of eighteen years record at an American consulate their intention to become residents and remain American citizens, and must also take an oath of allegiance upon attaining their
majority. But loss of protection is not the same as loss of citizenship
and the statute does not speak of loss of citizenship. However, under
the act of 1934, if only one parent is an American, the minor loses his
American citizenship if he fails to reside in the United States at least
five years continuously immediately prior to his eighteenth birthday,
and if he fails to take an oath of allegiance to the United States within
six months after his twenty-first birthday.
Thus with respect to minors who were citizens though not born in
the United States, the statutory situation may be summarized as follows: Minors who are citizens jure sanguinis because both parents are
Americans under certain circumstances will lose protection but not
citizenship. Minors who are citizens jure sanguinis because one parent
is an American under certain circumstances will lose citizenship as well
as protection. Minors who are citizens through the naturalization of
their parents are, under certain circumstances, subject to a rebuttable
presumption of loss of citizenship.
Before 1907 the concept of expatriation had been set forth in
the di:fferent cases as they arose, both by the courts 62 and the secretaries
of state.68 ln the statute of 1907 Congress defined the acts which might
constitute expatriation. The government in.its brief in Perkins v. Elg
noted that the 1906 board inquiring into the laws regarding expatriation recommended a provision assuring the expatriation of an American citizen upon his obtaining naturalization in a foreign state as
"de~aratory legislation." 6 ~ But the government admitted that none
of the cases analyzed by the board dealt with the problem of a minor
acquiring derivative naturalization in a foreign state. 65 In fact the
board quoted the statement in Ex parte Chin King,66 that "a father
cannot deprive his minor child of the status of American citizenship .•..
This status, once acquired, can only be lost or changed by the act of the
party when arrived at majority...."
82
See H. R. Doc. 326, 59th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 160-168 (1906) (Citizenship
of the United States, Expatriation, and Protection Abroad).
68
3 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAw DIGEST 7II-715 (1906).
H Brief for Petitioner, pp. 44-45.
65
As to the cases analyzed by the board see H. R. Doc. 326, 59th Cong., 2d sess.,
pp. 160 ff., 210 ff. (1906).
66
(C. C. Ore. 1888) 35 F. 354 at 356, quoted in H. R. Doc. 326, 59th Cong.,
2d sess., p. 76 ( I 906).
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It may be granted that cases decided prior to 1907 holding against
involuntary expatriation would not be authority that Congress by the
1907 act had not provided and provided validly for such expatriation.
As far as the federal courts were concerned, a single case had denied
the doctrine of expatriation. 67 The United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit 68 and that for the District of Columbia 69 in cases
decided after the I 907 act ruled against expatriation, while that for the
ninth circuit ruled in favor of it. 7° Federal district judges in New York
and Oregon also ruled against expatriation,11 as did a judge of the
United States District Court for Hawaii.12
The Supreme Court in Perkins v. Elg interpreted the statute as
being "aimed at a voluntary expatriation." 73 The Court found no
evidence in the terms of the statute "that it was intended to destroy
the right of a native citizen, removed from this country during minority, to elect to retain the citizenship acquired by birth and to return
here for that purpose." 14 Even if the minor by derivation from its
parents became naturalized under the foreign law, the minor still
retained the right of election in the absence of any statutory provision
to the contrary. The Supreme Court thus agreed with the court of
appeals, which also held that neither section 2 of the act of March 2,
1907, nor any other statute provided for involuntary expatriation.75
In further defense of the view that the statutes should not be
interpreted as providing for involuntary expatriation of minors, it may
be pointed out, as did Chief Justice Hughes,16 that sections 5 and 6
Ex parte Chin King, (C. C. Ore. 1888) 35 F. 354.
United States ex rel. Scimeca v. Husband, (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) 6 F. (2d)
957. The government in its Brief for Petitioner in Perkil!S v. Elg asserted that the
discussion was not even dictum, but mere speculation. Brief, p. 45.
•
69 Perkins v. Elg, (App. D. C. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 408. The Supreme Court
affirmed this part of the case in 307 U. S. 325, 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939).
70 United States v. Reid, (C. C. A. 9th, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 153, certiorari denied
because application not made early enough, 299 U.S. 544, 57 S. Ct. 44 (1936).
11 United States ~ rel. Baglivo v. Day, (D. C. N. Y. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 44; In
re Reid, (D. C. Ore. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 800, reversed in United States v. Rei<:!, (C. C.
A. 9th, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 153.
72 Case of Shizeru Kumagi, March 18, 1929, unreported. The case is cited in
a memorandum of the Solicitor for the Labor Department, contained in Supplemental
Memorandum for Petitioners in Perkins v. Elg, Appendix C, pp. 23, 29.
73 307 U.S. 325 at 343, 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939).
1 "' Ibid. The British statute, on the other hand, expressly expatriates British
minors acquiring foreign citizenship. 33 Viet., c. 14, § IO (3) (1870).
75 (App. D. C. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 408. The court of appeals even stated, p. 413,
that "it is doubtful, indeed, if there is any power in Congress,...:._in view of the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment •.• to take them [the rights of the child] away."
16 307 U. S. 325 at 344.
61
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of the act of 1907, which limit the rights 0£ children born without the
United States, are silent as to the loss of citizenship by minor children
born in the United States. 77 By implication, the statute at least does
not provide for involuntary expatriation of minors born in the United
States. That this is true under the statute was shown by the views
expressed in the instructions issued on November 24, 1923, by the
department of state to the American diplomatic and consular officers.78
Thus as late as 192 5 it was the view of the department of state that
the act of March 2, 1907, had not provided for the involuntary expatriation of minors born in the United States of alien parents.7° The
Supreine Court pointed out that the same view apparently prevailed
in July, 1929, when on the instructions of the secretary of state, the
state department issued a passport to Miss Elg as a citizen of the
United States. 80
In April, 1935, Miss Elg was notified that she was an alien and
was threatened with deportation. Thus between 1929 and 1935 a
71 It should be noted, however, that section 5 merely provides for the acquisition
of American citizenship by children born outside the United States of alien parents
through the naturalization of or resumption of American citizenship by the parents,
provided that the latter occur during the minority of the child and provided further
that the child begins to reside permanently in the United States. Section 5 is silent
as to loss of citizenship by such child. Section 6 deals with children born outside the
United States who are citizens because their parents are American citizens. Section 6
does not provide for loss of citizenship by such children. It merely requires the doing
of certain acts in order to receive the protection of the United States government.
But while section 6 seems to look only to protection, it has been construed, perhaps
erroneously, as limiting citizenship. Hence, since election is possible to the foreignborn, children of American citizens under section 6, it would seem anomalous to deny
that privilege to minors in the United States.
It should be noted that under the act of May 24, 1934, there may be a deprivation of citizenship as well as protection as to foreign-born children where one of the
parents is an alien. Orfield, "The Citizenship Act of 1934," 2 UNiv. CHI. L. REV.
99 at 102 (1934).
78 U. S. DEPT. STATE, CoMPILATION OF CERTAIN DEPARTMENT CIRCULARS
Relating to Citizenship, etc., pp. n8, 121, 127 (1925), containing instructions to
diplomatic and consular officers under date of November 24, 1923. The practice of
the department of state was summarized in' the circular instruction of Secretary of State
Hughes. The opinion in the present case was written by Mr. Hughes.
78 See opinion in Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 at 346, 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939).
The Court stated that no sensible distinction could be drawn between a minor whose
parents were aliens at the time of his birth and never lost their foreign nationality on
the one hand, and a minor whose parents became foreign nationals through naturalization, on the other hand. In the latter case as well as the former there was no involuntary expatriation.
80 However, the secretary of state informed the attorney general in a letter dated
January 21, 1937, that the issuance of this passport was the result of "clerical inadvertence." See Brief for Petitioner, p. 3, note 1.
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change had occurred in the attitude of the state department. In the
view of the Supreme Court 81 the change arose out of a conflict with
the opinion of the solicitor of the department of labor in the case of
Ingrid Therese Tobiassen. The department of labor favored the view
of no expatriation; 82 the state department took the opposite position.
The secretary of labor, because of that conflict, requested the opinion
of the attorney general, which was given on June 16, 1932.83 This
opinion held that a child born in the ·United States and taken to Norway by her parents had lost her American citizenship. The attorney
general approved the refusal of the state department to issue a passport to her on the ground that she had acquired Norwegian nationality
and had ceased to be an American citizen. The attorney general quoted
the provision of the treaty with Sweden and Norway of 18 69 and
referred to the Norwegian nationality law of August 8, 1924, and to
the provisions of .the act of Congress of March 2, 1907. But he based
his opinion upon the Norwegian law and not on the naturalization
treaty with Norway, nor on any act of Congress. Thus the opinion
does not directly support the view that the act of Congress of March
2, -1907, or any other act, authorized involuntary expatriation of
minors. The Supreme Court rejected the opinion of the attorney general, stating it was "compelled to agree with the Court of Appeals
in the instant case that the conclusions of that opinion are not adequately supported and are opposed to the established principles which
should govern the disposition of this case." 6 ~ It is of interest that the
first part of the brief for the government was devoted to showing that
by Swedish law as well as by treaty Miss Elg had become a Swedish
citizen. 85 The court of appeals had left open the question of the acquiPerkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 at 347, 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939).
For the view of the solicitor of the labor department, see Supplemental Memorandum for Petitioner in Perkins v. Elg, Appendix C, pp. 23-32.
83 36 OP. Arn. GEN. 535 (1932). However, Assistant Secretary of State Wilbur
J. Carr, in a letter dated October 7, 1931, to the Attorney General, stated: "This
Department has for many years uniformly held that former citizens of the United States
who have been naturalized during minority in foreign states through the naturalization
of their parents must be regarded as having lost their American nationality under the
provisions of Section 2 of the Act of Congress of March 2, 1907." Supplemental
Memorandum for Petitioners in Perkins v. Elg, Appendix A, pp. 9, IO.
The solicitor of the state department in a memorandum of August 17, 1926,
also found expatriation under the act of 1907. See Supplemental Memorandum for
Petitioners in Perkins v. Elg, Appendix A, pp. IO, 14-19.
The state department issued instructions to the same effect in 1917, 1921, and
1925. See Reply Brief for Petitioners in Perkins v. Elg, Appendix A, pp. 6-13.
8 ~Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 at 349, 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939).
85 Brief for the Petitioners, pp. 12-18. On the other hand, the respondent Miss
81
82

EXPATRIATION OF MINORS

sition of such citizenship. The Supreme Court did not definitely state
that she had acquired Swedish citizenship under the Swedish law. 88
But the Court held that, even if she had, she did not lose her American
citizenship.
The Supreme Court seems to have given no weight to the argument
made in the reply brief of the government 87 with respect to section 3 r7
of a draft nationality code prepared by representatives of the departments of state, justice, and labor, in pursuance of an executive order of
April 25, r933, designating the secretary of state, the attorney general,
and the secretary of labor as a committee to review the nationality laws
of the United States, to recommend revisions, and to codify the laws
into one comprehensive nationality law for submission to Congress.
This draft code was signed by the three cabinet members and submitted to the President, who sent it to Congress in June, r938. This
code assumed that there could be an involuntary expatriation of American minors and provided for their acquiring American citizenship
through naturalization. 88
The Supreme Court also rejected the view that private acts of
Congress, passed in r937 and r938 80 for the relief of native citizens
who had been the subject of administrative action denying their citizenship, could be treated as the equivalent of a federal statute providing
for involuntary expatriation.00 Su~h private acts, as in the case of the
readmission to citizenship of Mrs. Nellie Grant Sartoris, had been
invoked dialectically as evidence of Congressional views as to the
law.111 Such reasoning is no longer admissible.
Elg argued that the Swedish statute required not only a residence in Sweden but also
a Joss of American citizenship. Thus a difficult question of renvoi would be presented.
The Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs informed the American Legation at Stockholm that residence in Sweden with her father gave Miss Elg Swedish citizenship.
Brief, pp. 17-18.
86 307 U.S. 325 at 329.
87 Reply Brief, pp. 4-5.
88 Section 317 of the code is set out in the Reply Brief, pp. 14-15.
89 Act of July 13, 1937, 50 Stat. L. 1030; Act of June 25, 1938, 52 Stat. L.
1410.
00 307 U. S. 325 at 349•
111 Joint Resolution of May 18, 1898, 30 Stat. L. 1496. Some considered this a
Congressional admission that Miss Grant had been expatriated by her marriage to
Sartoris, a British subject. Borchard, "The Citizenship of Native-Born American
Women Who Married Foreigners Before March 2, 1907, and Acquired a Foreign
Domicile," 29 AM. J. INT. L. 396 at 4II (1935); 7 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 639
(1939); Brief for Petitioners in Perkins v. Elg, pp. 42-43.
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The Situation A part from Treaty and Statute
Suppose it be assumed, as so far seems to have been the fact, that
no treaty or statute deals or purports to deal with the subject of
expatriation of the various classes of American minors. For instance,
what was the ruJe before 1868, the date the Bancroft naturalization
treaties were first negotiated? The government relied, in Perkins v.
Elg, on the Treaty of 1869 with Sweden and Norway. And what was
the situation before Congress passed the act of March 2, 1907, dealing
with expatriation? In Perkins v. Elg the government also relied on
the act of 1907. Was there a common-law rule to be found in decisions
of the state courts, the federal courts, opinions of the attorney general
of the United States, rulings by the department of state, and views of
writers, providing for involuntary expatriation? The United States
Supreme Court in Perkins v. Elg 92 found no such common-law doctrine, just as it had found no doctrine of involuntary expatriation laid
down by treaty or statute.
In the early days there could be no question of expatriation of
American minors, since the United States followed the English common-law view that citizens could not be expatriated without the consent of the government; and that in the absence of statute there was
no possibility of expatriation.93 But in 1868 Congress passed a statute
declaratory of the right of expatriation. 9 ¾ In 1870 the British Parliament recognized the right. 95
The Supreme Court of the United States referred to the principle
of election in the year 1830 in Inglis v. Trustees of Sailor's Snug
Harbor. 06 In that case a minor born in the United States was taken
first to England and then to Nova Scotia. Justice Thompson stated
that "his infancy incapacitated him from making any election for
himself, and , his election and character followed that of his father,
subject to the right of disaffirmance in a reasonable time after the
termination of his minority...." However, it was not clear that the
minor had been born after American independence or before the British
military forces took possession of New York.
The New York court, in a case decided before the adoption of the
307 U. S. 325 at 329 ff., 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939).
See Brown, "Expatriation of Infants," 3 Umv; ToRONTO L. J. 97 (1939).
The early American doctrine is set forth by Story, J., in Shanks v. Dupont, 3 Pet.
(28 U. S.) 242 at 246 (1830).
H 15 Stat. L. 223 (1868), 8 U.S. C. (1934), § 15. But Congress did not define
expatriation before the Act of March 2, I 907.
95 Naturalization Act, 33 Viet., c. I 4 ( 18 70).
96 3 Pet. (28 U.S.) 99 (1830) (quotation from p. 126).'
92
98
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Fourteenth Amendment, the Bancroft treaties or the act of 1907,
found no expatriation and asserted a right of election in the minor on
attaining his majority. 97 The Vermont court took the same position.98
The Minnesota court in recent cases, in finding expatriation as to minors
born in the United States and taken to Canada, relied on the naturalization treaty with Great Britain of l 870 and the naturalization statutes
of the United States permitting foreign minors to become American
citizens through the naturalization of their parents. 99
The United States Circuit Court for Oregon in a case involving
Chinese children asserted the right of election.100 There the children
were born in the United States and then taken to China. The Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit made no reference to treaty
or statute and cited the practice of the state department allowing election.101 A federal district court in New York also relied on the practice
of the state department, indeed going so far as to say that a minor could
not expatriate himself even by joining a foreign army.102 The federal
district court in the Reid case 108 relied on the practice of the state department, the early state cases, the earlier view of the attorney general,
and the view of John Bassett Moore. The circuit court of appeals, in
reversing that case, asserted that the practice of the state department
as shown by a letter of October 7, 1931, had been to favor expatriation.104, The court also construed a treaty as providing for such expatriation. The court of appeals in Perkins v. Elg found the common
law rule not to provide for expatriation, as shown in rulings by the
state department, state decisions, and recent federal decisions.105
97 Ludlam v. Ludlam, 26 N. Y. 356 at 376 (1863). See also Lynch v. Clarke,
1 Sandf. (N. Y. Ch.) 583 (1844). In Ludlam v. Ludlam, the minor was a citizen
Jure sanguinis, having been born in Peru of an American father.
98 State v. Jackson, 79 Vt. 504, 65 A. 657 (1907). In this case, too, the minor
was a citizen Jure sanguinis, having been born in Canada of an American father.
99 Ostby v. Salmon, 177 Minn. 289, 225 N. W. 158 (1929); followed in Koppe
v. Pfefferle, 188 Minn. II9, 248 N. W. 41 (1935).
100 Ex parte Chin King, (D. C. Ore. 1888) 35 F. 354.
101 United States ex rel. Scimeca v. Husband, (C. C. A. 2d, 1925) 6 F. (2d)
957 at 958.
m United States ex rel. Baglivo v. Day, (D. C. N. Y. 1928) 28 F. (2d) 44.
103 In re Reid, (D. C. Ore. 1934) 6 F. Supp. 800 at 802-806, noted 34 CoL.
L. REv. 1366 (1934). The comment disapproves.
104 United States v. Reid, (C. C. A. 9th, 1934) 73 F. (2d) 153 at 156, noted
33 M1cH. L. REv. 1271 (1935), 19 MINN. L. REv. 589 (1935), 14 N. Y. UN1v.
L. Q. REV. 404 (1937), and by the writer in 13 NEB. L. BuLL. 466 (1935). All
comments approve except the last.
105 (App. D. C. 1938) 99 F. (2d) 408 at 412-413, noted in 7 GEo. WASH.
L. REV. 639 (1939), and by the writer in 18 NEB. L. BuLL. 72 (1939). The former
comment disapproves and the latter approves.
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Distinguished writers, such as Hyde,100 Borchard,101 Van Dyne,1°8
and Moore,109 were cited by Chief Justice Hughes in Perkins v. Elg 110
as taking the view that it was "a long recognized principle in this
country" that a minor born in the United States was not expatriated by
being taken by his parents to the country of their origin.
The attorney general in 1875 laid down the same view in Steinkauler's case. 111 This case arose prior to the act of Congress of 1907 but
subsequent to the naturalization treaty of 1868 with North Germany,112
the other country involved. Attorney General Edwards Pierrepont,
after reviewing, among other things, the naturalization treaty, concluded that the minor on reaching the age of twenty-one years could
"then elect whether he will return and take the nationality of his
birth, with its duties and privileges, or retairi the nationality acquired
by the act of his father."
But almost sixty years later in Citizenship of Tobiassen 118 the then
attorney general seems to have departed from this position. Although
he made reference to the existence of a naturalization treaty with
Norway, the other country involved, and quoted the act of Congress of
March 2, 1907, he expressly stated that expatriation rested not upon
·th~ treaty, but upon the Norwegian law. American statutes themselves
permitted alien minors to acquire American citizenship through the
naturalization of the father. Thus he seemed to be holding that aside
from treaty and act of Congress an American minor could be expatriated if the law of a foreign country, similar to our own naturalization
statute, conferred derivative citizenship upon minors. This was another
way of saying that the common law o:ffers no guaranty against expatriation. The Supreme Court in Perkins v. Elg 114 rejected the reasoning
of the attorney general in the Tobiassen case, and gave no comfort to
the suggestion by the petitioner 115 that it had never been settled whether
or not there were modes of expatriation in addition to those provided
106
101

I HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, §§ 374, 375 (1922).
BORCHARD, DIPLOMATIC PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD,

§ 259,

p. 584

(1915).
VAN DYNE, CITIZENSHIP OF THE UNITED STATES 25-31 (1904).
3 MooRE, INTERNATIONAL LAw DIGEST 532-551 (1906).
110 307 U.S. 325 at 329, note 2, 59 S. Ct. 884 (1939). For further citations
of writers' opinions, see Flournoy, "Dual Nationality and Election," 30 YALE L. J. 693
at 696-697 (1921).
111 15 OP. Arn. GEN. I 5 (1875) (quotation from p. 18).
112 15 Stat. L. 615 (1868).·
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for in the act of r907, treaties, and other statutes prescribing specific
modes of expatriation. The Court in fact ruled that the act of July 27,
r 868,116 which declared that "the right of expatriation is a natural and
inherent right of all people" dealt only with voluntary expatriation and
had no application to the removal from the United States of a native
citizen during minority.111
Long before the act of r907, a number of secretaries of state had
ruled in favor of the right of election. Secretary William M. Evarts,
in r879, in an instruction to the American minister to Germany, with
respect to the status of minors born in the United States of German
parentage, asserted that their rights rested "on the organic law of the
United States." 118 He took the same view as to a minor of Danish parentage in r880.119 Secretary Thomas F. Bayard, in answer to an inquiry
by the Netherlands legation as to a minor born in the United States of
Dutch parentage, repeated this view in r888. 120 In r906 a memorandum prepared in the department of state by its law officer was sent by
Acting Secretary of State Robert Bacon to the German ambassador
asserting such right as to a minor born in the United States of German
parentage.121 This was asserted although it was admitted that "there
is no express provision in the law of the United States giving election
of citizenship in such cases."
Chief Justice Hughes, having quoted liberally from the rulings,
stated that
"they leave no doubt of the controlling principle long recognized
by this Government. That principle, while administratively applied, cannot properly be regarded as a departmental creation
independently of the law. It was deemed to be a necessary consequence of the constitutional provision by which persons born
within the United States and subject to its jurisdiction become
citizens of the United States. To cause a loss of that citizenship in
the absence of treaty or statute having that e:ffect, there must be
some voluntary action and such action cannot be attributed to an
infant whose removal to another country is beyond his control
and who during minority is incapable of a binding choice." 122
116
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The opinion by no means clarifies the scope of the doctrine of
election. The Court ruled that where the minor returned to the United
States on his majority and chose to remain and to maintain his American citizenship, he had elected American citizenship.123 Does this mean
that a native born citizen must make an election immediately after
attaining majority and that failure affirmatively to indicate his desire
to retain American citizenship will constitute an abandonment of
American citizenship? The government in its brief attempted to narrow
the doctrine of election to cases of double allegiance at birth, so that
a child of native or naturalized parents born in the United States could
not elect.124 The Supreme Court gave no countenance to the argument.
Expatriation of American minors is primarily a question of municipal law. International law does not require the United States to recognize the expatriation of such minors; nor is international law violated
if the United States expatriates its minor citizens. Treaties may alter
the situation but have not expressly done so. Traditional international
law does not stand in the way of such policy as the United States wishes
to adopt.
The Federal Constitution confers no extensive guaranties against
involuntary expatriation of American minors even when born in the
United States. Such expatriation is valid where accomplished through
treaty or act of Congress. But in the absence of treaty or statute, involuntary expatriation by means of administrative ruling violates the
Fourteenth Amendment as to minors born in the United States.
Treaties and statutes will not, if ambiguous, be construed to provide for
expatriation. Existing treaties and statutes do not provide for expatriation of minors born in the United States. Nor do they do so as to
minors who are citizens jure sanguinis where both parents are Americans and one of them has resided in the United States prior to the birth
of the child. Where one of the parents is an alien, citizenship may be
lost under certain specified circumstances. Where the minor has been
naturalized derivatively through its parents, there is possibly a statutory presumption of loss of citizenship on return of the parents to the
home country, but such presumption is rebuttable.
Even aside from treaty and statute the practice of the attorney
general, secretary of state, and labor department, though in some confusion, has been opposed to involuntary expatriation and has favored
128
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the right of the child to elect American citizenship on attaining his
majority.
The decision in Perkins v. Elg keeps in force the policy of no expatriation until changed by treaty or statute. It gives adequate protection to American minors. Yet it does not prevent effective participation in international negotiation over this matter should a change become necessary or desirable. It points the way to Congress for further
study of the problem of expatriation of minors, perhaps to be climaxed
by enactment of clear, specific, and comprehensive legislation. It permits Congress to take account of possibilities of statelessness and of
cases where the minor does not accompany his parents out of the United
States. It indicates the need for more specific provisions in treaties. It
corrects and makes uniform the practice of the state, justice, and labor
departments, as well as clearing up the confusion in the lower federal
courts. Some lingering doubts are left as to the scope of the doctrine
of election.

